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Complaint Resolution in Nebraska:
Citizens, Bureaucrats and
The Ombudsman
I. INTRODUCTION
In both a constitutional and moral sense one fundamental tenet
of American ideology is the right of citizens to bring complaints
against their government and to petition for a redress of their griev-
ances. Americans have used many different avenues in pursuit of
complaint resolution. For instance, elected officials have always
been viewed as complaint resolvers. Mayors, governors and presi-
dents as well as councilmen, state legislators and members of Con-
gress continue in this role today. This article discusses the creation
and implementation of a new avenue for resolving citizen griev-
ances. It focuses on the introduction of an ombudsman into Ne-
braska state government.'
Starting in the early 19th century in Sweden, the ombudsman
institution has spread-first slowly, and now more rapidly-
throughout the world.2 An ombudsman is an official selected by
a legislature to investigate and make recommendations on -com-
plaints against administrative agencies which are brought to him
by private citizens. He may also initiate investigations on his own
motion. Appointed by the legislature for a fixed term and at a
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa
Barbara. This research was supported by a grant from the United
States Office of Economic Opportunity, Grant #CG-9041. The data
used herein originally appeared in the author's project report, THE
NEBRASKA OvmunsmAn~s : INNOVATiON iN STATE GOVERNET (1973).
1. NEB. Rav. STAT. §§ 81-8,240 et seq. (1971). Nebraska's ombudsman
has also been analyzed in Frank, The Nebraska Public Counsel-The
Ombudsman, 5 Cu MB nA-SApoR L. REV. 30 (1974).
2. See Rowat, The Spread of the Ombudsman Idea, Owmunsx~w FOR
AMERIcAN GOVERNMENT? 7 (Anderson ed. 1968). In the short time
since Rowat wrote this chapter, many new jurisdictions have been
added to the list. See K. WEEKs, OmDSMaa Anomm =m WoRm:
A Cowr\ARATm CnART (1973).
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fixed salary, he can usually be removed only by an extraordinary
legislative majority upon demonstration of adequate cause. To help
achieve impartiality and independence, legislatures have made om-
budsmen relatively free from direct, politically motivated reprisals.
Anderson offers a concise summary of an ombudsman's nature
when he says that "the essential characteristics of the ombudsman
post require that the individual filling it be: (1) independent, (2)
impartial, (3) expert in government, (4) universally accessible, and
(5) empowered only to recommend and to publicize."4
Although, as noted earlier, many types of complaint receiving
offices have existed for some time, there are now only four ombuds-
man offices in the United States which are patterned after the
original Swedish version. Hawaii was the first American jurisdic-
tion to establish an ombudsman who possesses most of the powers
and prerogatives of the Swedish version.5 Shortly after Nebraska's
ombudsman began operation in 1971, the Iowa legislature approved
a bill creating a state ombudsman (called a Citizens Aide) and
thereby gave statutory existence and independence to an executive
ombudsman then working out of the governor's office.6 The only
ombudsman in local government that falls within the same mold
as the three state offices just mentioned is the joint city-county
office in Seattle/King County, Washington."
3. For a more elaborate discussion of defining characteristics, see OM-
BUDSMNw FOR AMEicAN GovNmw r?, supra note 2, especially chap-
ters 2 and 5 and the model statute in the appendix. For common
variations on the original version, see A. WYNEm, EXECUTmVE OM-
BUDSEN IN THE UNITED STATE S (1973).
4. S. ANDERSoN, OMmuDsmAN PAPERs: AmERICAN EXPERIENCE AND PRo-
PosALs 3-4 (1969).
5. HAWAu Rsv. ST.AT. §§ 96-1 et seq. (1968). Enabling legislation was
passed in June, 1967, but it took almost two years of searching and
legislative maneuvering until Herman Doi was appointed ombuds-
man in April, 1969. Doi has been so skillful that the other American
ombudsmen looked to him as a model during their formative periods.
6. IowA CODE ANx. §§ 601G.1 et seq. (Cum. Pamphlet 1974).
7. The Dayton, Ohio ombudsman bears many similarities to the classi-
cal version but it is not included here because it is not based on a
statute but rather the voluntary acquiescence of the city, county and
school board. See Goodstein, An Evaluation of the Dayton Ombuds-
man (Charles F. Kettering Foundation 1972). At the time this article
was written the city of Detroit had recently approved a new charter
which included a provision for an ombudsman.
In addition, Kansas and Minnesota have provided for ombudsmen
in correctional institutions. See KAN. STAT. AxN. § 75-5231 (Supp.
1973); Mn. STAT. ANN. § 241.407 (Cum. Supp. 1974). A number of
state and local governments provide for complaint-handling officers
who do not fit the model of the Swedish ombudsman in all particulars.
See Frank, supra note 1, at 31 n.1O.
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During the 1960s and in the first few years of this decade, discus-
sion about the desirability of American adoption of the ombudsman
institution was based on speculation, informed guesswork, or ex-
tremely limited empirical data. The principal proponents of the
ombudsman argued: 8
L All modern bureaucratized societies, almost by defini-
tion, will be "plagued" by a citizenry which experiences
a significant degree of frustration in its relations with
public bureaucracies.
2. Any modern, bureaucratized society that adheres to a
democratic creed has an obligation to seek resolution of
citizens' complaints against public bureaucracies; these
complaints can lead to frustration and in the extreme,
alienation.
3. The most reliable institution for resolving citizens' com-
plaints with a high degree of skill and public acceptance
is the ombudsman.
Those who opposed or seriously questioned the need for an om-
budsman in the United States based their objections on any one
of several grounds:9
1. The United States is too big, geographically and in popu-
lation, for the idea to work.
2. Two key components of our political system-federalism
and separation of power-make the idea impractical.
For example, an ombudsman would usurp traditional
legislative and judicial functions.
3. The quality of service rendered by public bureaucracies
is good, and an external complaint resolution office is
unnecessary. Further, an ombudsman would simply
become another bureaucratized office and not have
much impact.
4. Establishing an ombudsman will divert attention from
more "pressing" reforms.
8. See, e.g., OmuiSsA Pon AAmEacAx Gov Rm ?, supra note 2;
W. GELLHoRx, OmmusNmx AND OTnERs (1966); Tnm Om'DmAN:
CiTizs Dam DER (D. Rowat, 2d ed. 1968).
9. See, e.g., Lowi, THE END oF LiBmaAsi (1969); Schick, Toward the
Cybernetic State, PUBLIC AD1MISTR TION II AT T OF TURBULENCE
214 (Woldo, ed. 1971); Capozzola, An American Ombudsman: Prob-
lems and Prospects, 21 W. PoL. Q. 289 (1968); Rosenblum, Controlling
the Bureaucracy of the Antipoverty Program, 31 LAw & CONTErap.
PROB. 187 (1966); Sandier, The Ombudsman: Who is He?-Is He
Needed?, 17 VrrAL IssuEs, No. 6 (1968); Zeidler, An Ombudsman for
Cities?, 377 AxALs Am. ACAD. 123 (1968).
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Now that we have experience with a few American ombudsmen,
empirical evidence can be marshalled to challenge or confirm these
different contentions. This article is a description, analysis, and
evaluation of the Nebraska state ombudsman. Section II discusses
the politics surrounding approval and appointment of the first om-
budsman. Section III examines the ombudsman's statutory powers
and operating procedures. Section IV presents a statistical analysis
of his caseload. The final section offers an evaluation of the first
two years of the Nebraska ombudsman's activities and a commen-
tary on the degree to which this office has dealt with the criticisms
voiced about ombudsmen prior to their establishment in the United
States. Although this article is about one particular ombudsman,
the underlying topic concerns complaint resolution in a society with
both democratic political traditions and a highly bureaucratized
government. The ombudsman is one way a modern democracy can
provide fair and speedy resolution of complaints against public
bureaucracies. Its success or failure reflects upon the nature of
the political system itself.
II. THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION
AND APPOINTMENT
Near the end of the 1969 legislative session, freshman Senator
Loran Schmit succeeded in persuading a bare majority of his col-
leagues to pass Legislative Bill 521 ("L.B. 521") establishing the
Nebraska ombudsman.10 This section details the process through
which Schmit maneuvered L.B. 521 into law and the subsequent
appointment of the first ombudsman. The political battles attend-
ant to adoption and appointment provide important clues to under-
standing and evaluating the subsequent performance of the Ne-
braska ombudsman.
A. Clearing the Legislative Hurdles
After advancing from the Committee on the Judiciary with a
unanimous favorable recommendation in January 1969,11 L.B. 521
was sent to the Unicameral for debate and consideration. In a state
with a usually active corps of lobbyists in the state capitol, L.B.
521 failed to attract their attention and not one lobbyist spoke out
publicly in support of or in opposition to the bill.12 The bill passed
without a vote to spare.13
10. N E. REV. STAT.§§ 81-8,240 et seq. (1971). L.B. 521 was co-sponsored
by Schmit and Senator Willard I Waldo.
11. Hearings on LB 521 Before the Judiciary Comm., 80th Neb. Leg. Sess.,
at 43 (1969).
12. Id. at 36-43.
13. Requiring an absolute majority of 25 of the 49 members, the final tally
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During the floor debate, senators opposed to L.B. 521 focused
their attack in four areas: 14
1. The new office would be costly in terms of both the pro-
posed salary of $20,500 for the ombudsman and the total
operating expenses.
2. An ombudsman was superfluous at best because legis-
lators were already acting as ombudsmen for their con-
stituents.
3. An ombudsman would interfere with the normal oper-
ating routines of administrative agencies and hamper
their efficiency.
4. Nebraska should not be used as an experimental testing
ground for a foreign idea, untried in the United States.
Proponents of L.B. 521, led by Senator Schmit, responded to
these criticisms. The salary and operating expenses were deleted
from the bill and instead the legislature's Executive Board-com-
posed of legislative leaders-was instructed to set the salary, so that
an appropriation bill could be introduced later.15 To the claim that
legislators were already ombudsmen, proponents responded by call-
ing such a statement "naive;" part-time legislators had neither the
time nor expertise to guide citizens through the bureaucracy.16
Rather than worry about interference with agency operations, Sen-
ator Schmit suggested that his colleagues consider the plight of a
citizen in the face of either staff mistakes or incompetence. Fur-
ther, it was suggested that the ombudsman's modus operandi would
emphasize persuasion and compromise rather than head-on con-
flict.1 7 Discomfort with uniqueness-the fourth objection-is dif-
difficult to fight because there are no substantive grounds upon
which to base a counterattack. This objection leads the discussion
away from the merits of the proposal and into an arena in which
each legislator's attitude about risk-taking becomes primary.
was 25 voting in the affirmative, 15 voting in the negative, 7 not
voting and 2 absent. Senators from the metropolitan areas of Lincoln
and Omaha joined with two senators from smaller cities and nine
rural senators to form the winning coalition in the non-partisan
legislature. All but one of the Lincoln and Omaha senators who voted
on L.B. 521 supported the legislation. The senators from small cities
and rural areas were almost evenly divided between affirmative and
negative positions. 1969 NEB. LEG. Jmm. 3073-74 (July 22, 1969).
14. Transcript of Debate on LB 521, 80th Neb. Leg. Sess., 1520-28 (May
19, 1969).
15. Id. at 2678-82 (July 9, 1969).
16. Id. at 1525 (May 19, 1969).
17. Id. at 1526.
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B. Appointing the First Ombudsman
The official Nebraska Legislative Journal contains this bland
entry for May 5, 1971: "The Executive Board herewith submits the
name of Murrell McNeil to the position of Ombudsman."'' 8 In the
subsequent vote, McNeil was unanimously approved as Nebraska's
first ombudsman, although 11 senators did not vote on the nomina-
tion. To say that the vote was anticlimactic would be a gross
understatement. So much uncertainty and controversy over the
appointment plagued the almost two-year interval between passage
of L.B. 521 and McNeil's nomination that establishment of the office
became problematical. The final version of L.B. 521 gave the
Executive Board responsibility for nominating an ombudsman and
setting his salary. The Executive Board was required to send the
nomination to the Unicameral, where a two-thirds vote was neces-
sary for confirmation. 9
Two powerful members of the Executive Board had voted
against L.B. 521, and the Board did not seem in any hurry to make
the nomination.20 The question of finances was settled in May 1970,
when the United States Office of Economic Opportunity ("OEO")
agreed to underwrite almost totally the ombudsman's salary and
office expenses. OEO offered a grant of $70,530 for the first year's
operation, with the understanding that the office would be eligible
for a similar and final grant the following year.2 ' As with so many
other activities of state governments, the carrot of federal money
was dangled before the legislature's Executive Board. That the
legislature finally implemented the ombudsman office must be at-
tributed in great measure to this source of "free money."
After an extended search, the first attempt to nominate an om-
budsman was aborted by a combination of politically motivated sus-
picion from the governor and a salary dispute between the Execu-
tive Board and the potential nominee. When the dust had settled
on this attempt, the Executive Board turned to a man literally un-
18. 1971 Nim. LEG. JRNL. 1647 (May 5, 1971).
19. NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-8,241 (1971).
20. Senator Leslie Stull, Vice President of the Executive Board, and Sen-
ator William H. Hasebroock, Speaker of the Legislature, were members
of the Board who opposed the passage of L.B. 521. 1969 NEB. LEG. JRNL.
3073-74 (July 22, 1969).
21. OEO's involvement with the Nebraska ombudsman began as a result
of pure happenstance. While Governor Tiemann was attending a
meeting in Washington, D.C., he heard a casual remark that OEO was
interested in funding ombudsman demonstration projects. Remem-
bering that Nebraska's ombudsman had not received an appropriation,
Tiemann pursued this conversation and before long, OEO was talking
to Senator Schmit and others about federal funding,
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der its nose. After consultation with Senator Schmit, the nomina-
tion was offered to Murrell McNeil, who at that time was working
on the staff of the Legislative Council.22 After a few days of hesi-
tation and thought, McNeil accepted the nomination with the salary
set at $17,500.
The controversy over salary was about more than money. Sal-
ary denotes status and importance, and that was what motivated
the controversy. To be effective, an ombudsman must have status
and perceived importance, and in Nebraska the ombudsman's salary
gives him both. His salary compares favorably with that paid such
officials as the secretary of state, the state treasurer, the auditor
of public accounts, and other similar executive officials. Since his
appointment, the ombudsman's salary has been raised to account
for inflation, but he maintains parity with executive officials such
as those just named. His current salary is $18,400.
C. Legislators as Complaint Handlers
The new ombudsman did not step into a vacuum in the field
of complaint processing. Because of their relatively small num-
ber, one might expect Nebraska's forty-nine legislators to have
high public visibility. If this assumption is true, then one might
further expect state senators to be the recipients of many constituent
complaints. Because of the ombudsman's close association with the
legislature and the criticisms mentioned earlier about usurpation
of legislative functions, legislative complaint handling practices
were examined for 1972 and 1973.23
22. McNeil had already completed two careers-one of long and one of
short duration-when the legislature appointed him as ombudsman.
McNeil retired as an Army Lieutenant Colonel in 1963 after twenty-
two years in the service. His second career started in 1966 when Gov-
ernor Tiemann appointed him state tax commissioner. Although he
was not re-appointed to the position in 1970 by newly elected Gov-
ernor Exon, during the four years of his tenure McNeil was a publicly
visible state administrator. He became tax commissioner at the very
time Nebraska first imposed a sales and income tax on its citizens.
Through extensive media coverage and endless speaking at public
gatherings, McNeil became a well-known official. And, of course, the
nature of his job meant that he had close contact with legislators.
23. During June 1972 and June 1973, all Nebraska legislators were mailed
a questionnaire designed to assess the nature of the contact they had
with constituents. The two sets of questionnaires are not cumulative
-although the same questions were asked both times-because there
were eleven new senators in 1973. The response rate in 1972 was
71% (35) and in 1973 it was 69% (34). Not all legislators indicated
applicable responses to each question. Therefore, some of the data re-
ported here represent replies from less than 35 (in 1972) or 34 (1973)
senators.
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When the Nebraska legislature was in session, the average num-
ber of contacts per week that senators estimated receiving from
citizens was 43 (N=33) in 1972 and 62 (N-32) in 1973; and when
the legislature was not meeting, the average number per week
dropped to 13 in 1972 and 11 in 1973.24 Legislators were asked to
indicate the nature of these contacts, presumably combining both
in- and out-of-session perceptions. Legislators' perceptions about
the nature of their contacts with the public changed from 1972 to
1973.25 Of the changes, the decline in the percentage of complaints
is of special interest. Nebraskans are either complaining less to
legislators because they are voicing their complaints to other per-
sons or perhaps they are complaining less to all potential complaint
recipients.
When legislators were asked to identify the most common type
of complaints received (out of the total amount of contacts), they
did not name specific agencies against which citizens brought griev-
ances.2 6 Rather, they spoke in more general terms, and appeared
to be grouping the complaints into categories. For instance, instead
of specifying that he received complaints about abusive behavior
by a particular official of a particular agency, the legislator would
simply indicate "harassment by agency personnel."
Averaging their responses about complaints only, legislators in
24. The number of contacts per week varies enormously. The responses
ranged from a low of 2 per week to a high of 150 per week for in-ses-
sion contacts, and from a low of 1 to a high of 50 per week for out-of-
session contacts.
25. Percentage of legislator's contacts with citizens that were:
1972 1973
Opinions on Issues or Suggestions
for Legislation 50% 67%
Requests for Legislation 31% 21%
Complaints about State Government 15% 9%
Other 4% 3%
100% 100%
(N=35) (N=33)
26. Legislators could indicate more than one kind of complaint. They
are summarized and arrayed below:
1972 1973
Taxes and/or the Cost of Government 30% 18%
Agency Regulations or Administration
of Regulations, or Agency Personnel 27% 32%
Pending or Recently Enacted Legislation 22% 23%
Communication: Inability to Know
Where to Go or to Whom to Speak
About a Problem 11% 10%
Miscellaneous 10% 17%
100% 100%
(N=56) (N=69)
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1972 reported that 34 per cent of the complaints received about state
government were valid, while the figure rose to 43 per cent in 1973.
The questionnaire suggested that a valid and justified complaint
occurred when the state government made an error or when an in-
dividual had been treated improperly by an agency.
Looking ahead to subsequent analysis of the ombudsman's case-
load, it is worth noting at this point that 52 per cent of the legisla-
tors' complaint caseload in 1972 and 41 per cent in 1973 was in areas
that seldom are brought to the ombudsman's attention-namely,
taxes and legislation. Although there is some overlap between the
ombudsman's work and the legislators' citizen contact caseload, it
appears that Nebraskans are using their legislators and their om-
budsman as different kinds of complaint channels. This point, plus
the fact that only a small percentage of the senators' public contact
involves citizens' complaints, offers evidence to refute the criticisms
of the ombudsman advanced during legislative consideration of L.B.
521-namely, that legislators are already serving as ombudsmen.
III. POWERS AND PROCEDURE OF THE
NEBRASKA OMBUDSMAN
A. Staiutory Authority
Before analyzing the performance of the Nebraska ombudsman,
it is helpful to consider his statutory authority and methods of
operation.27 The Nebraska law calls the ombudsman a "Public
Counsel," apparently because the legislature was concerned that
citizens would be unfamilar with the Scandinavian term. 28 Never-
theless, Nebraska's Public Counsel has recognized his title to be a
misnomer and has uniformly referred to himself as the state's "om-
budsman.' 29 The remainder of this article will use the latter term
because it is more indicative of the type of position created by L.B.
521.
The Nebraska law provides that the ombudsman "shall be a per-
son well equipped to analyze the problems of law, administration,
and public policy."30 A person may not serve as ombudsman within
two years after being in the legislature or while he is a candidate
for or holds any other state office. The law further forbids the
27. For a comparison of the Nebraska statute with other ombudsmen
laws, both enacted and proposed, see Frank, supra note 1, at 38-49.
28. Hearings, supra note 11, at 40 (Mr. Evans' testimony).
29. See, e.g., 1 NEa. O DmuDssAT REP. 13 (1972): "The word [ombudsman]
is new in our vocabulary, however, that fact must be overcome. An
advantage of the word is that once it is known to the public, the com-
munication net is established."
30. NEB. Rxv. STAT. § 81-8,242 (Reissue 1971).
10 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 54, NO. 1 (1975)
ombudsman from being active in partisan affairs or engaging in
any other paying occupation during his term.31 He is to be ap-
pointed by a two-thirds vote of the legislature from nominations
submitted by the Legislative Council's Executive Board.32
The ombudsman's jurisdiction extends to "administrative acts"
of "administrative agencies." An "administrative act" includes
"every action, rule, regulation, order, omission, decision, recom-
mendation, practice, or procedure of an administrative agency.13 3
The term "administrative agency" extends to any governmental
unit or official acting or purporting to act for the State of Nebraska.
The law expressly excepts from the ombudsman's purview courts,
legislative employees, the governor and his staff, employees of
political subdivisions and interstate instrumentalities, and federal
agencies. 31
The ombudsman may investigate any administrative act of any
administrative agency, either in response to a complaint or on his
own motion. 5 When a complaint about an agency is received, he
is directed to conduct a suitable investigation and make a report
to both the complainant and agency involved, unless 'he determines
the investigation to be unnecessary. 36 In addition, he may under-
take an inquiry into a particular act or agency or into administra-
tive procedures generally, if he believes such a study will enhance
knowledge about or promote improvements in agency functioning.87
In determining which matters to consider, the ombudsman is di-
rected to "address himself particularly" to certain types of abuses. 3s
31. Id.
32. Id. § 81-8,241. He may also be removed by a two-thirds vote of the
legislature upon a determination that he has become "incapacitated or
has been guilty of neglect of duty or misconduct." Id. § 81-8,243.
The ombudsman is directed to appoint a "deputy public counsel," as
well as other necessary staff. Id. § 81-8,242. In the event the ombuds-
man is removed, his deputy serves as acting ombudsman until a suc-
cessor is appointed. Id. § 81-8,243.
33. Id. § 81-8,240(1).
34. Id. § 81-8,240(2).
35. Id. § 81-8,245(1).
36. Id. § 81-8,247.
37. Id. § 81-8,245 (5).
38. Id. § 81-8,246. He is directed to focus on administrative acts that
might be:
(1) Contrary to law or regulation;(2) Unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, or inconsistent with
the general course of an administrative agency's judgments;(3) Mistaken in law or arbitrary in ascertainments of
fact;
(4) Improper in motivation or based on irrelevant con-
siderations;
(5) Unclear or inadequately explained when reasons
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In pursuit of his investigations, the ombudsman is given broad
powers to request information from administrative agencies; to in-
spect and examine records and documents; to enter the premises
within any agency's control; and to issue a subpoena, if necessary,
to compel a witness to appear or an agency to produce documents.
He also has broad discretion to shape his investigations and to de-
termine the frequency and methods of reports. 39 Before announc-
ing a conclusion critical of an agency or individual, he must consult
with the agency or person involved.40 If he believes the agency
should consider a matter further or take other appropriate action,
he may so advise the agency; but if the source of the problem is
a statute "whose results are unfair or objectionable," he may recom-
mend statutory change to the legislature.41
The Nebraska law is careful to delineate the relationship be-
tween the ombudsman and the courts. As noted earlier, the om-
budsman's jurisdiction excludes the state courts.42 The law further
provides that no proceeding, expression or opinion of the ombuds-
man is subject to judicial review, and the ombudsman and his staff
cannot be called to testify in a judicial or administrative proceeding
except where necessary to enforce the ombudsman law. 43 In the
event his investigation uncovers evidence of criminal conduct by
an official or employee, he is directed to turn the matter over to
the appropriate authorities.4 4 Finally, the law creates a criminal
sanction for persons who willfully obstruct, hinder, mislead or at-
tempt to mislead the ombudsman in the exercise of his functions.4
B. Operation Procedures of the Ombudsman Office
Within the statutory framework, the ombudsman has articulated
three goals to guide his office's operating procedures: (1) keep the
office small, easily accessible, and relatively inexpensive; (2) de-
velop an efficient office routine; and (3) acquaint Nebraskans with
the office's potential.
should have been revealed; or(6) Inefficiently performed.
39. Id. § 81-8,245(2)-(4).
40. Id. § 81-8,248. The ombudsman may publish his conclusions by trans-
witting them to the governor, the legislature, the press, or others who
may be concerned. He is directed to include any explanatory state-
ments by an administrative agency named in an opinion adverse to the
agency. Id. § 81-8,250. In addition, he must file an annual report to
the legislature. Id. § 81-8,251.
41. Id. § 81-8,249.
42. Id. § 81-8,240(1); see text accompanying note 34 supra.
43. Id. § 81-8,253.
44. Id. § 81-8,252.
45. Id. § 81-8,254. Interfering with the ombudsman is a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars.
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1. Staff
Flying in the face of the traditional American pattern of large,
complex bureaucratic structures, but entirely in keeping with the
spirit and intent of ombudsman legislation, the Nebraska ombuds-
man has kept his office staff small.46 In addition to himself, he em-
ploys one full-time administrative assistant, one part-time typist,
and a lawyer who spends about one-third of his work week in the
ombudsman's office. He handles almost all of the casework him-
self, relying upon the lawyer for legal advice or legal research.
With few exceptions, every letter addressed to a citizen and most
correspondence with agencies is actually dictated and signed by the
ombudsman.
47
2. Office Routine
All organizations adopt a set of rules to guide daily behavior.
Several operating rules adopted by the Nebraska ombudsman have
had an impact on the office's character. For example, the office
will accept anonymous complaints provided they are not directed
against specific agency personnel. 48 But the office refuses to accept
complaints lodged against individuals unless the complainant fully
identifies himself. In such cases, the ombudsman will protect the
complainant's identity if he desires and if it is possible. But to
46. During the 26-month period from May 1, 1971 to June 30, 1973, ex-
penditures were $87,261:
Staff salaries $67,094
Operating expenses 7,906
Supplies and materials 560
Travel expenses 1,971
Capital outlay 6,243
In-kind services provided by the
state (office space & utilities) 3,487
$87,261
Because salaries comprise such a large percentage of any budget, the
ombudsman's personal attention to the caseload with the consequent
small staff permits the office to operate on a modest budget.
47. There are clear opportunity costs attached to this style of thorough
personal attention to the caseload. For instance, despite his active ef-
forts at publicizing the office, a state as large as Nebraska is a chal-
lenge to anyone disseminating information about a new governmental
service. The need for publicity is almost endless. Rather than spend
as much time as he does on the casework, the ombudsman could have
chosen to delegate some of that responsibility and spend even more
time on publicity. Another cost of this style is the possibility that
the quantity of work will dampen motivation to spend the time re-
quired by truly complicated cases.
48. As a matter of record, he has received only two anonymous complaints
to date,
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help preclude unfounded and malicious attacks on state employees,
he insists that the complainant reveal his identity.
Although L.B. 521 can be read to require citizens to exhaust all
their potential administrative remedies, the ombudsman never tells
citizens to "come back later." Such an interpretation would be im-
practical and if strictly enforced would erode public support for
the office. Under this strict interpretation, the ombudsman would
ask a citizen to trace, in detail, all his attempts to resolve the issue.
Many would not remember or understand all that had happened
and would be frustrated in their attempt to secure the ombuds-
man's aid, because he would send them to an agency to guarantee
exhaustion of all possible remedies. Further, one of the reasons
that the ombudsman was established, and one of the reasons that
many citizens use the office, is precisely to abate or avoid the buck-
passing, "no, you're in the wrong office" routine that afflicts many
governmental agencies.
3. Publicity for the Office
The ombudsman is extremely conscious of the need for dissemin-
ating information about the office. A mutually beneficial relation-
ship has developed between the media and the ombudsman. He
has been appropriately aggressive in seeking out the media and in-
forming Nebraskans through it. As nearly as can be determined
by reading Nebraska newspaper stories and editorials, the ombuds-
man enjoys the confidence of the media. For instance, the Lincoln
Star editorialized that "The Nebraska Ombudsman program, as it
looks now, was a wise experiment."49 Newspapers support his of-
fice, and that support not only helps inform Nebraskans, but also
has a positive effect on legislators.
An important test of the ombudsman's acceptance came when
the original OEO grant was about to expire in 1973. The office's
request for state funding was an important hurdle, which would
provide a good indication about the ombudsman's acceptance as a
regular and continuing part of state government. Refusal to sup-
port the ombudsman with state money could be taken as an indica-
tor of failure. With neither debate nor dissent, the legislature
unanimously approved the ombudsman budget request. 9 Com-
paring the narrow one-vote margin by which the office was estab-
lished 51 with the unanimous agreement to provide state money
strongly suggests that the office has passed the first tests of a new
institution and moved to a new level of support and opportunities.
49. Lincoln, Star, January 21, 1972, editorial page.
50. Transcript of Debate on LB 259, 83d Neb. Leg., 1st Sess., 1382-83
(April 19, 1973).
51. See note 13 supra.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE OMBUDSMAN'S CASELOAD
The Nebraska ombudsman has been in operation for a sufficient
period of time to draw some meaningful conclusions about the na-
ture of his caseload and his manner of handling complaints. This
section analyzes five aspects of his caseload: (1) the number and
type of cases; (2) the elapsed time in resolving cases; (3) referrals
from legislators; (4) the agencies which are the subject of com-
plaints; and (5) cases brought by poor Nebraskans. A close look
at these considerations casts light on the objections originally raised
when the Nebraska ombudsman's office was created.52
A. Number and Type of Cases
For the 26-month period of May 1971 through June 1973, the
ombudsman recorded 1,526 cases.53 As Table I indicates, cases may
be categorized into two main types: inquiries and complaints.
Fifty-nine per cent of the cases were complaints, and the remainder
inquiries. Although a strict reading of the ombudsman legisla-
tion would suggest that only complaints ought to be within the
office's jurisdiction, this is an unwarranted and impractical inter-
pretation. The Nebraska ombudsman was created to assist citizens
when they have problems with the state government; often these
problems are articulated as a question in search of guidance about
how to resolve the problem. Further, many questions are implied
complaints. If a citizen asks, "Why didn't I get my tax refund last
month?," he may be implying an unwarranted slowness on the part
of the bureaucracy-that is, a complaint. For these reasons, the
ombudsman has properly allowed his office to answer questions
that citizens bring forward.
1. Case Categories
To understand the categorization of cases handled by the ombuds-
52. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text supra.
53. This includes only those cases for which records have been kept. Sev-
eral hundred contacts with the office were not recorded because they
were simple questions and requests often involving nonjurisdictional
matters, such as "Where do I get a city (state) map?"
Another important qualification is simple, but is often overlooked
in presenting quantitative caseload data: caseload does not necessarily
equal workload. The amount of time and intellectual effort demanded
by different cases can vary enormously. Where one case may be sat-
isfactorily completed in one morning with a few phone calls, another
case may require many days of nearly constant attention. Hence, it
is nonsensical to engage in any computations of average amount of
time or average amount of money to complete a "typical" case; the
range is too large to permit the clculatiop of a meaningful average
figure,
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Table 1
Category of Case, Nebraska Ombudsman,
May 1971 through June 1973
Complaint, Jurisdiction, Justified 13.1%1
Complaint, Jurisdiction, Partially Justified 4.9%h 33.4% (509)
Complaint, Jurisdiction, Unjustified 15.3%J
Complaint, No Jurisdiction,
No Assistance Provided 4.4% 25.3% (386)Complaint, No Jurisdiction,
Assistance Provided 20.9%1
Inquiry, Jurisdiction 29.0% 29.0% (443)
Inquiry, No Jurisdiction, I
No Assistance Provided I.% 11.7% (179)
Inquiry, No Jurisdiction, Assistance 10.3%J
Not Recorded 0.6% 0.6% ( 9)
TOTAL 99.9% (N=1526)
man, several interpretative comments are necessary. The ombuds-
man's jurisdiction is limited to administrative agencies of the state
government.54 A case, inquiry or complaint, is classified as "no
jurisdiction" if the subject matter pertains to anything other than
the functions of a state agency. The ombudsman usually provides
some form of assistance for individuals presenting no jurisdiction
complaints or inquiries. Often he will write a letter to the proper
office or public official; in no jurisdiction cases that appear critical,
he will often take whatever steps he can to see whether the problem
can be alleviated informally. Those no jurisdiction cases in which
he does no more than advise the citizen of the proper place to file
a case are categorized as "no jurisdiction, no assistance provided."
Yet, even here, the ombudsman is, of course, helping the citizen
by providing proper direction.
Table 1 also indicates the ombudsman's judgment about the
justifiability of the complaints that fall within his legislatively
mandated jurisdiction. Looking only at jurisdictional complaints,
the table shows that 40 per cent are justified, 15 per cent are par-
tially justified, and 45 per cent are not justified in the ombudsman's
judgment.
2. Types of Complaints
Because of our special interest in the types of complaints (as
54, Nrs, R&v. STAT. §§ 81-8,240(1), 8,245 (Reissue 1971).
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opposed to inquiries) brought to the ombudsman, Table 2 presents
a classification of complaint type for both jurisdiction and no-juris-
diction complaints. These complaint types are based on the alle-
gations of the citizen making the complaint. Most of the juris-
dictional complaints allege an inadequacy in administrative proce-
dure or the rendering of an inappropriate administtrative opinion.
Apparently, very few citizens are involved in a dispute with an
agency over factual matters. A sizable number of no jurisdiction
complaints allege the presence of either an inadequate or unfair
law or they are complaints about a private legal matter.
Table 2
Type of Complaint for Both Jurisdiction and No Jurisdiction
Complaints, May 1971 through June 1973t
No
Jurisdiction Jurisdiction
Complaint Type Complaints Complaints Total
Adequacy of administrative procedure 36.9% 17.4% 28.5%
Appropriateness of administrative
opinion 24.8 22.3 23.8
Dispute about the facts of
a case 1.7 0.0 1.0
Inadequate or unfair law 9.5 17.1 12.8
M.isconduct of officials 7.4 10.9 8.9
Inadequate administrative
communication 14.0 2.3 9.0
Consumer 2.1 8.3 4.8
Private dispute or legal matter 1.2 17.1 8.0
Other 2.3 4.7 3.3
99.9% 100.1% 100.1%
TOTAL (N=515) (N=386) (N=901)
t The classification scheme for type of complaints is adapted from one
devised in Mall, Colorado's Ombudsman Office, 45 DENvER L.J. 132(1968).
To clarify further different types of complaints citizens bring
to the office, Table 3 provides an opportunity to assess the justifica-
tion, if any, of complaints that fall into the eight complaint catego-
ries. Of most interest are the complaints over which the ombuds-
man has jurisdiction. In those cases outside his legal jurisdiction
there are often serious limits placed on his ability to pursue a com-
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plaint. Therefore, no jurisdiction complaints, while perhaps sug-
gestive, are not accorded the same importance in this analysis.
Table 3 clearly shows that most complaints which are judged
partially justified or completely justified allege an inadequacy in
administrative procedure. In this instance, a procedure is defined
as any operating rule or regulation, formal or informal, that ad-
ministrative agencies employ in their decision making. The om-
budsman's tasks in this kind of complaint are to assure himself and
the citizen that the procedure is fair and that it is being applied
in an equitable manner.5 The largest number of unjustified com-
plaints alleged an inappropriate administrative opinion. This is not
surprising, because the ombudsman's job should not lead him to
second-guess administrators who have followed proper law and
procedure and who have arrived at a decision which, while reason-
able, differs from that desired by the citizen. As long as the om-
budsman is satisfied that reasonable discretion has been exercised-
with due regard for mitigating circumstances-he must necessarily
find for the agency. Such a finding, however, does not prevent
him from offering advice, off the record, to the agency or to the
citizen about ways to avoid further conflict.
3. Official Misconduct
While small in number-9 per cent of the total complaints-
those complaints alleging some form of misconduct by public offi-
cials have a slightly higher than average level of justification. Of
the thirty-eight complaints within the ombudsman's jurisdiction
that alleged misconduct, 53 per cent were either totally justified
or partially justified. Apparently, Nebraskans do not find many
specific public bureaucrats about whom they feel obliged to com-
plain, but when they do lodge such a complaint the odds are slightly
better than even that the complaint is at least partially justified.
One further note about the no jurisdiction caseload that the om-
budsman received: almost 38 per cent of the total no jurisdiction
caseload involved Nebraska local government-counties, cities, and
other subdivisions of government. And of -those no jurisdiction
cases about local government that were brought to the ombudsman,
fully 73 per cent were complaints. Because these complaints are
beyond his legal jurisdiction, the ombudsman does not make a judg-
ment about the justification of the local government complaints.56
There is no reason to suspect, however, that the rate of justified
complaints for local government would be substantially less than
55. Id. §§ 81-8,246, 8,249.
56. Id. § 81-8,240(1).
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the rate for state government; in fact, there are some indications
that the justification rate is probably higher for local government.
It is apparent from the data that many Nebraskans are unhappy
with some aspects of their local government, and they are turning
to the state for redress.
B. Elapsed Time from Start to Finish
Delay is an anathema to the ombudsman's office. Quick res-
olution of a case is a primary goal. A speedy resolution of most
cases requires not only efficient operating procedures in the om-
budsman's office, but the cooperation of the agencies with which
the ombudsman must communicate. The Nebraska ombudsman not
only works quickly but he has obviously received excellent coopera-
tion from the bureaucracy.57 Table 4 gives firm evidence of the
speed with which Nebraskans can expect a final disposition.
Table 4
Number of Days Needed to Close Cases,
May 1971 through June 1973
Complaints Inquiries
Number of Days No No
From Juris- Juris- Juris- Juris-
Receipt to Close diction diction diction diction Total
1-3 days 39.7% 59.1% 67.0% 73.7% 56.6%
4-7 days 20.6 19.7 19.2 11.7 18.9
8-14 days .15.9 10.9 9.5 8.4 11.9
15-21 days 6.3 4.1 1.4 1.7 3.8
22-30 days 6.1 2.1 1.1 1.1 3.0
31-90 days 8.6 2.3 1.4 1.7 4.4
Over 90 days 1.6 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.6
Open or
discontinued 1.2 1.0 0.2 1.1 0.8
TOTAL 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
(N=509) (N=386) (N=443) (N=179) (N=1,517) t
t Excluding 9 "Not recorded" cases.
Two characteristics in the data of Table 4 deserve mention.
During the second year of operation, the percentage of cases com-
57. The quick turnaround time on cases may mean several other things.
For instance if the ombudsman is presenting only easily-handled re-
quests to the agencies, then they can give him quick responses. Or
a fast turnaround time may indicate that he does not often disagree
with an agency's explanation for its handling of a case; disagreement
usually means further communication with the agency and, there-
fore, a loss of time.
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pleted in less than three days increased from 52.5 per cent to 56.6
per cent. This slight increase is evidence of further experience;
providing the workload and staff remain as they are now, it is dif-
ficult to see how the percentage of cases closed so quickly can be
increased much more. The cases which take the longest to complete
are the justified complaints: only 29 per cent of them are com-
pleted in less than three days. Justified complaints are often very
complicated cases, and may require extensive communication be-
tween the agency, ombudsman, and aggrieved citizen. Rapid han-
dling of casework does not necessarily demonstrate the ombuds-
man's effectiveness, but it gives good evidence that he is meeting
one important goal of his office-providing quick service to citizens
with no more delay than is absolutely necessary.
When L.B. 521 was debated on the floor of the legislature, one
objection to the ombudsman legislation suggested that the ombuds-
man would interfere with the "normal" activities of the adminis-
trative agencies.58 While far from proving this objection's falsity,
the speed with which agencies respond to requests for information
suggests that at least agencies are not attempting to hinder the om-
budsman by delaying their responses.
C. Referrals from Legislators
One gauge of the ombudsman's acceptance by the legislature is
the large number of cases that senators have either presented di-
rectly or through referral of citizens to the ombudsman.59 Several
senators have taken advantage of comments made during committee
hearings and floor debate on L.B. 521 which suggested that the om-
budsman could help legislators do research on policy matters. Al-
though as a practical matter, it is difficult for the ombudsman to
refuse such requests, this kind of work was not envisioned by L.B.
521. The high percentage of his caseload that comes from legisla-
tive referral shows that the ombudsman is not seen as a threat
to legislative-constituent relations. On the contrary, legislators
seem to have learned that he can be helpful in dealing with constit-
uents.60 But the large number of legislative referrals, and the in-
58. See note 14 and accompanying text su.pra.
59. Of the ombudsman's entire twenty-six month caseload, 26% (397)
came to his attention directly from or referred by a senator. (During
the second year of operation, the percentage of legislative referrals
climbed to 33%.) During the fiscal year 1971-1972, 37 senators used
his office at least once and during the fiscal year 1972-1973, the number
rose to 43 of the 49 senators. These figures do not include policy re-
search requests from the senators.
60. The number of legislative referrals exceeded similar referrals received
by the Iowa or Hawaii state ombudsman. Several reasons account for
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crease from 21 per cent of his caseload in 1971-1972 to 33 per cent
of his caseload in 1972-1973, provide some grounds for consideration
of the ombudsman's legislative relationships. Does he work too
closely with the senators? Is a disproportionate share of his case-
load coming from legislators?
The dangers of a high legislative referral caseload are two-fold.
First, as the percentage of referred cases increases, then necessarily
the proposition of citizen originated cases must decline. The om-
budsman was intended to be directly available to private citizens.
For this direct access to be a reality, the ombudsman must continu-
ally publicize his office and encourage individuals to voice their
complaints directly to him. If the public "learns" during the om-
budsman's formative years that it is helpful to speak with their
senator first, then the fundamental character of the office would
be changed. 61
The second problem posed by extensive legislative referrals is
the possibility that these cases will be treated preferentially. As
illustrated above, the ombudsman processes all his cases quickly,
so legislative referrals are not getting unusually fast handling. It
does not appear that he has treated legislators' cases differently.
With only a few exceptions, the caseload resulting from senatorial
referral is no different in substance or number of justifiable com-
plaints than the caseload coming directly from private citizens.
When necessary, he has not hesitated to tell a senator that one of
his constitutents' complaints is not justified.
Ultimately, the ombudsman is responsible to the legislature. By
encouraging senators to use his office, he has been able to earn
their approval while at the same time maintaining the degree of
independence required by the ombudsman concept. An ombudsman
is independent if he can say "no" to legislative and executive offi-
the legislative referrals. First, and perhaps most importantly, is
Murrell McNeil's reputation and personal relationships with the
senators. Throughout Nebraska state government, but especially in
the legislature, McNeil is widely respected as a man of unquestioned
ability and integrity. What this means for legislators is simple: Mc-
Nell can be trusted to keep confidences and not to become involved in
the legislature's internal power struggles.
Confidence in the ombudsman works with two other factors to
increase his legislative referrals. One is physical proximity. His of-
fice is in the capitol building, and, in fact, is located adjacent to sena-
torial offices. Finally, the Nebraska legislature does not provide
much in the way of staff or secretarial support for itself. The lack
of personal staff encourages senators to refer constituents.
61. The British Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration receives
complaints only from legislators. See Gwyn, The British PCA:
Ombudsman or Ombudsmouse?, 35 J. Porrcrcs 45 (1973).
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cials, as well as to citizens, when his judgment tells him it is re-
quired.
D. Agencies Involved in Cases
Examining the extent to which the caseload involves each state
agency indicates the subject matter of his caseload as well. State
government is organized along functional lines, e.g., the Roads De-
partment is responsible for state roads and the Department of
Revenue collects taxes. It is therefore not surprising that those
Nebraska agencies with the highest number of employees, and con-
currently the greatest daily contact with the public, also are the
subject of the greatest proportion of the ombudsman's caseload.
Eight departments were involved in 51 per cent of the 952 cases
that fell within the ombudsman's jurisdiction: Education, Health,
Labor, Motor Vehicles, Public Institutions, Public Welfare, Rev-
enue, and Roads. The remainder of the jurisdictional caseload was
divided between boards, commissions, minor state offices, and the
university. For the eight departments, the percentage of either
partially or totally justified complaints is virtually identical with
the partially or totally justified complaints for the entire caseload.
Although they are larger, these eight departments fare no worse
than the smaller state agencies. 62
E. Cases from the Nebraska Poor
The ombudsman has sought to identify all cases in which the
poor were requesting service. Believing it inappropriate to ask citi-
zens their income and assets, the office has relied upon a less offen-
sive but less accurate guide to identify the poor. All clientele who
are on some form of public assistance or who are eligible for welfare
are classified as poor. This scheme probably underestimates the
number of poor who use the office, but without further prying into
individuals' financial records, it must suffice. Using the criteria
62. As a result of his previous service as tax commissioner, Murrell Mc-
Nel has many acquaintances at the top of administrative agencies.
Apparently he felt comfortable going to the upper hierarchical levels
of agencies, because in 47% of the 579 cases where data are available,
the ombudsman contacted the head of an agency, a personal assistant
to the head or the number-two man in the agency. In 23% of the
cases, he discussed the case with middle-level management in an
agency, e.g., a bureau chief, and in 30% of the cases, a staff member
at a lower level (often an operational job) was contacted. The large
number of times that the ombudsman went directly to the top is
unusual in light of other ombudsmen's experience, but the circum-
stances of McNeil's background made this a likely route for him to
pursue.
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just mentioned, the ombudsman served 153 poor citizens, which is
10 per cent of his total caseload. According to the United States
Bureau of the Census, 13.1 per cent of all Nebraskans have an in-
come less than the poverty level.63
Tables 5 and 6 compare the type of cases and complaints brought
by the poor and non-poor. The poor bring a higher percentage of
complaints to the office, as opposed to inquiries, and they have a
higher percentage of their complaints judged unjustified. There
is an important explanation for the higher rate of unjustified com-
plaints. The agency most frequently involved in cases from the
poor is the Department of Public Welfare. Most of the unjustified
complaints are about welfare payments, rules, and procedures.
State law vests enormous discretion with county welfare agencies
and the ombudsman's jurisdiction does not extend to these county
welfare agencies. His jurisdiction is limited to those few instances
where the Department of Public Welfare has rules and procedures
governing local welfare administration. Most of the welfare com-
plaints discussed with state welfare personnel are unjustified in the
Table 5
Type of Case for Poor and Non-Poor Citizens
Using Ombudsman's Office,
May 1971 through June 1973
Economic Class
Type of Case Poor Not Poor Total
Complaint, Jurisdiction, Justified 12.4% 13.2% 13.1%
Complaint, Jurisdiction, Partially
Justified 4.5 5.0 4.9
Complaint, Jurisdiction, Unjustified 26.1 14.1 15.3
Complaint, No Jurisdiction,
No Assistance 3.3 4.5 4.4
Complaint, No Jurisdiction, Assistance 22.2 20.8 20.9
Inquiry, Jurisdiction 20.3 30.0 29.0
Inquiry, No Jurisdiction,
No Assistance 1.3 1.4 1.4
Inquiry, No Jurisdiction, Assistance 9.2 10.4 10.3
Not Recorded 0.6 0.6 0.6
TOTAL 100 % 100 % 99.9%(N=153) (N=1,373) (N=1,526)
63. U.S. DEP'T or CoMnEcE, BuREAu or um CENsus, CENsus oF Popu-
LATION: 1970, GENRmAL SocAL AN EcoNoimc CHAACTEPsTIcs: NE-
BRASKA, at 29-196 (1972).
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sense that no violation of law or procedure has been perpetrated.
Instead, the complainant's ire has been aroused by the discretionary
action of a local welfare official-something neither the state
agency nor the ombudsman can affect. These complaints are con-
sidered within his jurisdiction for our coding purposes because of
the potential involvement by the state agency, but the line between
an unjustified and no-jurisdiction complaint is not easily drawn in
such cases.
Table 6
Type of Complaint for Jurisdiction and No Jurisdiction Complaints
From Poor and Non-Poor Citizens,
May 1971 through June 1973.
Economic Class
Complaint Type Poor Not Poor Total
Adequacy of administrative procedure 29.2% 28.4% 28.5%
Appropriateness of administrative opinion 32.1 22.6 23.8
Dispute about the facts 1.9 0.9 1.0
Inadequate or unfair laws 9.4 13.2 12.8
Misconduct of officials 9.4 8.8 8.9
Inadequate administrative communication 6.6 9.3 9.0
Consumer complaint 0.0 5.5 4.9
Private legal matter 7.5 8.1 8.0
Other 3.8 3.1 3.2
TOTAL 99.9% 99.9% 100.1%(N=106) (N=795) (N=901)
Table 5 shows a distinct similarity between the types of com-
plaints brought by the poor and non-poor and the time required
to close both poor and non-poor cases. With the exception of the
Departmet of Public Welfare, the poor bring cases to the ombuds-
man concerning other state agencies in roughly the same proportion
as those from the non-poor. More than welfare troubles the poor.
V. CONCLUSION: RESPONSE TO THE CRITICISMS
As an ombudsman seeks improvement in the administration of
laws, he addresses three problems of bureaucracy-equity, respon-
siveness, and efficiency.64 Equity refers to the need for like cases
to be treated alike. Responsiveness appeals to the contrary need
for comparison, exceptions and awareness of mitigating circum-
stances as a part of administrative decisionmaking. The efficiency
64. Wilson, The Bureaucracy Problem, 6 PuBLIc IN~masT 3-9 (1967). Wil-
son also identifies two other problems of bureaucracy: accountability
and fiscal integrity.
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problem concerns the need of "maximizing output for a given ex-
penditure, or minimizing expenditures for a given output."65 Find-
ing the proper blend of these three values-equity, responsiveness,
and efficiency-constitutes the basic responsibility of an ombuds-
man.60 This is not an easy task, nor is it easy for an observer to
measure success and failure.
One way to judge the Nebraska ombudsman's performance is
to refer to criticisms of the ombudsman idea. Several criticisms
were mentioned earlier.67 To the extent that these criticisms are
inappropriate there is evidence that the ombudsman is effective.
But evidence of a more positive nature is also available.
To say that ombudsmen will not work in the United States be-
cause the country is too big is a naive criticism, envisioning an
ombudsman for the federal government and overlooking the im-
portant role played by state and local governments. The geo-
graphic and population size of Nebraska, and most states, is similar
to that of other countries where the ombudsman has been success-
fully introduced. Size can present very serious logistical problems
for an ombudsman but they are not insurmountable in most politi-
cal jurisdictions in the United States.
It is also argued that a federal system with responsibilities and
functions overlapping different levels of government makes it im-
practical to establish an ombudsman at any one level. Yet this
criticism ignores the relatively high degree of operational autonomy
enjoyed by state and local government in a multitude of areas. Ne-
braska's ombudsman has been able to "forget" the federal gov-
ernment in the vast majority of cases he has handled. Any prob-
lems created because of a lack of jurisdiction over local govern-
ments are amenable to correction by the state legislature if it so
chooses. Some confusion and even friction has occurred at the
edges of the jurisdictional boundaries, but they have not hampered
his operations.
Criticisms about the difficulties for ombudsmen due to separa-
tion of legislative, executive and judicial powers, point to some po-
tentially serious problems. One such problem has been eliminated
by removing the judiciary from the ombudsman's scrutiny and
denying the ombudsman the ability to prosecute cases of suspected
65. Id. at 4-5.
66. This article has cited instances where the ombudsman has contributed
to greater equity and responsiveness by the state bureaucracy. The
cumulative effect of these efforts in individual cases is to increase the
overall efficiency of the bureaucracy. It should be further noted that
in certain cases the result of complaint resolution is to directly increase
the efficiency of specific agencies.
67. See note 9 supra.
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illegal actions. 68 Nebraska's ombudsman, and all American ombuds-
men, may not interfere in the judicial process and must turn over
evidence of illegal activity to appropriate prosecutors.
Because the ombudsman is an officer of the legislature it has
been assumed that a constitutionally separate executive branch
would fight his examinations of its activity. This has not happened
to any degree in Nebraska for at least two reasons. First, it is to
the governor's advantage to have executive departments cooperate
with the ombudsman. Second, American legislatures have always
exercised legislative review of executive actions and the ombuds-
man may be regarded as a new type of review.
To argue that the quality of service rendered by public bureau-
cracies is good and therefore an ombudsman is not necessary is to
take a firm stance on a very slippery surface. "Quality" is almost
entirely subjective. Wherever an ombudsman has been established,
including Nebraska, the number of aggrieved citizens who come for-
ward suggests that government in these jurisdictions has not been
universally satisfactory.
The last major criticism of ombudsmen is that it would displace
concern with more pressing problems and create an impression that
all was well. 69 This reasoning was thought to be especially true
for the poor. What this argument seems to ignore are the every-
day realities facing the poor. While social reformers continue to
clamor for basic reforms, the simple fact is that the poor must at-
tempt to cope with their present environment. What is a "little"
problem? Is it a missing welfare check, non-enforcement of hous-
ing codes, lack of a Department of Motor Vehicle licensing office
in poor neighborhoods, or tax forms not printed in Spanish? These
are the kinds of problems an ombudsman can address. Although
resolving these will do little, if anything, toward basic social re-
forms, the plight of aggrieved poor citizens may be eased. Respond-
ing to complaints about current procedures and rules does not nec-
essarily interfere with attention to the larger issues.
Many of the criticisms leveled against ombudsmen were made
before any had been established in the United States. Most of the
major criticisms, or at least their basic thrust, were off the mark.
Experience in Nebraska has shown that an ombudsman can func-
tion well in an American political environment. No ombudsman
will ever completely solve the "bureaucracy -problem", but he can
make progress toward diminishing the deleterious effects of bureau-
cracy.
68. See notes 42-45 and accompanying text supra.
69. For a good discussion of this assertion, see Moore, Ombudsman and
the Ghetto, 1 CoNx. L. REv. 244 (1968).
